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NO WAY OUT: THE CURRENT MILITARY COMMISSIONS
MESS AT GUANTANAMO
Stevie Moreno Haire*
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 22, 2009, President Barack Obama declared that he would
close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba within one year. 1
More than ten years later, the United States Department of Defense, as of
this writing, is seeking funding from Congress to build hospice care
facilities at the detention camp, preparing to keep the site open for another
twenty-five years.2 The current U.S. President has expressed his
unequivocal support for keeping Guantanamo Bay open, at one point
promising to fill it up with more people. 3 Now that the era of executive
mercy has ended, a disturbing reality confronts scholars and other
Americans who had been thinking of Guantanamo Bay as merely another
sad chapter in our history. The human rights abuses inherent in indefinite
detention that characterized the War on Terror remain unresolved, and will
likely be as much a part of our future as our past.
Although Supreme Court cases that have been hailed as victories for
detainees appeared at first to balance need to enforce their constitutional
rights with the goal of holding accountable those who have committed
atrocities, developments in the law during President Obama’s tenure eroded
the possibility of achieving either aim. Because of these developments,
using the judiciary as a means of escape from Guantanamo is practically
impossible in all but the most clear-cut instances. Consequently, the
minute the executive branch shifted its approach to detainee adjudication,
nearly every potential avenue for enforcing the fundamental right to
freedom for the men still locked up there was foreclosed. Ironically, this
*
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Obama Signs Order to Close Guantanamo Bay Facility, CNN (Jan. 22, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/01/22/guantanamo.order/index.html.
2
Carol Rosenberg, Guantanamo Bay as a Nursing Home, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/27/us/politics/guantanamo-bay-aging-terrorism-suspectsmedical-care.html.
3
Scott Neuman, Trump Signs Order to Keep Prison at Guantanamo Bay Open, NPR
(Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/31/582033937/trumpsigns-order-to-keep-prison-at-guantanamo-bay-open.
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development, devastating as it is to those in detention, is equally ruinous
for the possibility of holding terrorists accountable. In this Comment I will
use the lens of plea bargaining to elucidate how exactly the legal and
practical developments of the past decade have defeated the opportunity for
justice and closure for both detainees and for the victims of terrorist
attacks. By looking at the incredible pressures to submit a guilty plea that
would be present even for a hypothetical innocent detainee (were a plea
bargain made available), we can see that the military commissions offer no
hope of uncovering truth or advancing justice and instead provide
incentives for fabrication and false testimony.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the slow evolution of the right of
Guantanamo detainees to the writ of habeas corpus and the development of
the military commissions over the course of two presidential
administrations. This section will clarify how habeas corpus went from a
promising option for detainees to the false promise that it is now. Part III
of this Comment will look at the specific factors that create much more
intense pressure to plead guilty in the military commissions system than in
Article III courts. Parts IV and V will explain how legal and logistical
hurdles that have come up in recent years have complicated the possibility
of proceeding through the military commissions for detainees who do
choose to enter guilty pleas, as well as for those who prefer to proceed to
trial. These sections will demonstrate the pressure detainees face to plead
guilty rather than go to trial, before looking at the practical impossibility of
actually arranging a plea agreement that does not include testimony against
another detainee as a condition. This analysis will illustrate that the
military commissions system has become so mangled by legal and political
issues that have intensified over the last few years that it cannot produce
justice for detainees or for those harmed in the acts of terrorism of which
the detainees are accused. Section VI, the Conclusion, will suggest that the
only practical solution to this problem is to bring the detainees to the
United States for trials in Article III courts.
II: GUANTANAMO’S BEGINNINGS: GAINING THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL
The detention center at Guantanamo Bay has a long history, but for
the purposes of this Comment, it came into use as a place to house
detainees of the War on Terror. Throughout the Bush and Obama
administrations, the site served as a temporary home for 780 men. 4
Because the legal history of Guantanamo Bay is long and complex, this

4

Guantanamo: Facts and Figures, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.
hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2017/03/30/guantanamo-facts-and-figures.
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Comment will break down the detention center’s history by administration.
A. The Bush Years
On September 11, 2001, the United States was shaken by a terrorist
attack of a magnitude never seen before on American soil. 5 The culprit was
swiftly identified as a radical Islamist terrorist organization colloquially
known as al-Qaeda.6 Exactly one week later, on September 18, 2001,
Congress passed and the President signed the Authorization for the Use of
Military Force (AUMF).7 The scope of this legislation was vast, stating
that:
the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.8
Shortly thereafter, the President released a Military Order entitled
“Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism,”9 which formed the groundwork for the policy of
detaining “enemy combatants” in off-shore facilities, one of which was the
detention camp at Guantanamo Bay. 10 This established some basic
parameters for detainee treatment and put in place the principle that those
detainees who face trial would be tried by military commission. 11
A series of Supreme Court cases created the foundation of what legal
protections are afforded to detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Rasul v. Bush12
was crucial in establishing due process rights for detainees at Guantanamo
and clarified that detainees at Guantanamo Bay are entitled to the right of
habeas corpus so that they can challenge the factual basis for their
detention.13 Rasul was the beginning of a struggle between the judiciary
and the other two branches of government. After Rasul, the executive
5
See Terrorist Attacks in the U.S. or Against Americans, INFOPLEASE,
https://www.infoplease.com/world/disasters/man-made/terrorist-attacks-in-the-us-oragainst-americans (last visited June 1, 2019).
6
Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2013).
7
Id.
8
Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
9
66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
10
Aaron J. Jackson, Habeas Corpus in the Global War on Terror, 65 A.F. L. REV. 263,
276–77 (2010).
11
66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
12
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
13
Id. at 480–81.
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branch changed its procedures, creating the Combatant Status Review
Tribunals (CSRTs) in an attempt to provide the process due to detainees so
as to circumvent the need for habeas petitions. 14 As different habeas cases
for detainees worked their way through the judicial system, Congress
stepped in and passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (2005 DTA),
which explicitly denied the right of habeas corpus to detainees at
Guantanamo. 15 In the years to follow, Hamdan v. Bush (Hamdan I) 16
declared the CSRTs as insufficient under the Geneva Convention’s
standards, and held that detainees who had begun their habeas petitions
prior to the passage of the 2005 DTA would be able to continue forward
with their cases.17 Boumediene v.
Bush18 was the final chapter in the habeas saga, granting all detainees
a right to habeas review. Boumediene also held that the 2005 DTA did not
provide the level of procedural protection that would substitute for habeas
review. 19 From this point forward, even those detainees who had been
deemed “unlawful enemy combatants” by the CSRTs would be able to
challenge their detention in the federal courts.20
B. The Obama Years
Before coming into office, President Barack Obama ran on a platform
of change.21 Included in such a promise was the closing of Guantanamo
Bay.22 Early on, this looked achievable. 23 On January 22, 2009, he enacted
an executive order demanding the closure of Guantanamo Bay within one
year of the Order’s execution.24 To implement the order, the Attorney
General created an entity called the Guantanamo Review Task Force, along
14

Jackson, supra note 10, at 277.
Id.
16
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
17
Id. at 567, 573–74. This case also called into question for the first time whether or
not conspiracy could be tried as a war crime. Id. at 563–64. Because the case was not
dispositive on the issue, I do not discuss it in this Comment. For more on this matter, see
infra Part III.
18
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
19
Id. at 733.
20
See generally Boumedine, 553 U.S. 723.
21
Farah Stockman, Candidates Hold Stances on Guantanamo, BOS. GLOBE (May 11,
2008), http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/05/11/candidates_hold_stances_
on_guantanamo.
22
Id.
23
Close
the
Guantanamo
Bay
Detention
Center,
POLITIFACT
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/promise/177/close-theguantanamo-bay-detention-center (last visited Jan. 11, 2019) (collecting articles from 2009
to 2017 tracking the history of Obama’s progress on closing the detention center).
24
Obama Signs Order to Close Guantanamo Bay Facility, supra note 1.
15
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with a senior-level Review Panel to determine the “disposition” of each
detainee. 25 These entities, which were made up of “career professionals”
from different agencies charged with national security and intelligence,
examined information related to each individual detainee before making
final judgments that separated detainees into four categories. 26 In its final
report on January 22, 2010, the Guantanamo Review Task Force
determined that 126 detainees could safely be transferred outside the
United States; 44 could be prosecuted in federal court or the military
commissions; 30 Yemeni detainees could be transferred conditionally, due
to security concerns in their home country; and 48 detainees were simply
“too dangerous to transfer but not feasible for prosecution.”27 After the
initial determinations by the Guantanamo Review Task Force, the President
signed Executive Order 13567, which set up regular hearings called
Periodic Review Boards (PRBs) to reassess the fates of the detainees not
cleared for transfer or prosecution. 28
During this time, Congress also worked to clear up uncertainty around
the future of Guantanamo and the military commissions leftover from the
Bush administration. Congress amended military commission procedures
in the Military Commission Act of 2009 (“2009 MCA”) to reflect a new set
of rights for detainees when challenging their detention in federal court.29
The 2009 MCA also introduced the term “unprivileged enemy
belligerents,” which served to replace “unlawful enemy combatants.”30 In
2010, Congress passed new rules for the military commissions, barring
judges from granting credit for time served when sentencing defendants
convicted of war crimes.31
While Congress and President Obama formally implemented
legislation to guide the military commissions, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia (“D.C. District Court”) and the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit
Court”) ironed out the contours of how the historic Boumediene decision
would be understood. Although the newfound ability for detainees to
25
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET AL., Final Report: Guantanamo Review Task Force, at i
(2010) [hereinafter Guantanamo Final Report].
26
Guantanamo Final Report, supra note 25, at i–ii.
27
Guantanamo Final Report, supra note 25, at ii.
28
Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant
to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg.
13,277 (Mar. 7, 2011).
29
See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2574 (2009).
30
Id. at 2575.
31
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS § 1113(d)(1) (2010) (“Any
period of confinement included in the sentence of a military commission begins to run from
the date the sentence is adjudged. . . .”).
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challenge their detention through the federal court system initially
produced many successful habeas petitions in the D.C. District Court, 32 the
success of Guantanamo habeas petitions on the whole was short-lived. In
Al-Adahi v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit Court reversed the lower court’s
holding that al-Adahi was not part of al-Qaeda and that he should be
released. 33 Although Al-Adahi did not explicitly change the government’s
standard of proof needed to justify his continued detention, the D.C. Circuit
Court was careful to note that the “some evidence” standard had been
applied in numerous habeas cases before Guantanamo and that Boumediene
had left open the question of what the lowest constitutional standard might
be. 34 Subsequent district court decisions denied release of detainees much
more frequently, and appeared to employ a much more deferential standard
to the government’s evidence.35 Between the Al-Adahi decision on July 13,
2010 and October 12, 2011, all but one habeas petition heard in the D.C.
District court was denied. This sole petition granted was ultimately
reversed by the D.C. Circuit court.36 This trend has continued into the
present, with one Circuit Judge in 2018 going so far as to say that “when it
comes to Guantanamo, this court has reversed each and every recent grant
of habeas relief it has considered on the merits,”37 and adding that “the en
banc court has reason to consider whether we have faithfully implemented
Boumediene.”38
The year 2011 proved to be important for the legal landscape
surrounding Guantanamo Bay. Through the Ike Skelton National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (“NDAA 2011”), Congress
specifically prohibited the use of defense funds to transfer detainees from
Guantanamo Bay to the United States or to build U.S. facilities to house
them. 39 This move effectively foiled any plan to try the alleged 9/11
32

Twenty out of thirty-four habeas petitions between 11/20/08 and 7/8/2010 were
successful. Mark Denbeaux et al., No Hearing Habeas: D.C. Circuit Restricts Meaningful
Review 5 (2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2145554.
33
Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
34
Id. at 1104.
35
See Denbeaux et al., supra note 32, at 6; Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 748 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (quoting Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011)) (“To meet its
burden, ‘the government must put forth credible facts demonstrating that the petitioner
meets the detention standard, which is then compared to a detainee’s facts and
explanation.’”).
36
Denbeaux et al., supra note 32, at 4.
37
Qassim v. Trump, No. 18-5148, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 22579, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
14, 2018) (Tatel, J., concurring).
38
Id.
39
Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No.
111-383, § 1032 (transfer of detainees); 124 Stat. 4137 (2011) (transfer of detainees); Id. §
1034 (facilities).
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conspirators in an Article III federal court.40 On December 31, 2011,
Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA
2012”).41 Section 1021(a) of the Act finally codified the authorization for
detention of “covered persons” that the courts had been reading into the
AUMF for years.42 Additionally, Section 1021(b) cleared up confusion
about whether or not the standard for “unprivileged enemy belligerents,”
subject to trial by military commission, are defined in exactly the same
way as those who are subject to military detention. The section states that a
“covered person” is:
(1) A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored those responsible for those attacks.
(2) A person who was a part of or substantially supported alQaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,
including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has
directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces. 43
Because this definition is not identical to the one given for an “unprivileged
enemy belligerent” in the 2009 MCA,44 this Comment will use the older
term “unlawful enemy combatant” to refer to detainees who meet the above
definition.
During the remaining years of his presidency, President Obama
continued to voice his dedication to closing Guantanamo. 45 Although
President Obama failed to close Guantanamo Bay, and grant detainees
sufficient legal rights to challenge their detentions, more than 200 men
were transferred out of the detention center during Obama’s presidency. 46
40
For an analysis of how this act interacted with other law to affect this result, see
David J.R. Frakt, Prisoners of Congress: The Constitutional and Political Clash Over
Detainees and the Closure of Guantanamo, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 179, 221 (2012).
41
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125
Stat. 1298 (2011).
42
Id. § 1021(a).
43
Id. § 1021(b).
44
Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 948(a)(7), 123 Stat. 2574,
2575 (2009) (defining an “unprivileged enemy belligerent” as someone who: ”(A) has
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; (B) has purposefully
and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; or (C)
was a part of al Qaeda at the time of the alleged offense under this chapter.”).
45
See generally Close the Guantanamo Bay Detention Center, POLITIFACT :
OBAMETER, https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/promise/177/close
-the-guantanamo-bay-detention-center (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (collecting articles from
2009 to 2017 tracking the history of Obama’s progress on closing the detention center).
46
See A History of the Detainee Population, N.Y. TIMES: GUANTANAMO DOCKET,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
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This small victory left only forty-one detainees remaining in Guantanamo
when President Trump came into office in the fall of 2016.47
III: THE PRESSURE TO PLEAD IN THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS:
ANALYZING THE FACTORS THAT IMPEDE GUANTANAMO DETAINEES IN
SECURING FREEDOM
Examining the current situation at Guantanamo Bay through the lens
of plea bargaining may seem an odd choice, considering that far more
detainees have secured release from the island through transfer than
through entering into plea agreements with the military commissions. 48
This Comment, however, uses this framework because transfer is an option
that becomes available only when offered by the government within the
PRB process, which is completely discretionary. 49 It may be because of the
discretion the executive branch has in choosing to employ the PRBs at all
that some observers claim they have ceased functioning as they did
previously since President Trump has come into office. 50 Examining the
shortcomings of Guantanamo by looking at the pressure on a hypothetically
innocent detainee to plead guilty also provides a simple way to understand
the severity of the injustice inherent in the present system. It should be
noted, however, that the pressure to plead does not necessarily imply a
means of effecting a plea, as some detainees have learned after attempting
to enter plea bargains and failing to secure the assent of the government. 51
In order to understand the specific factors that would lead a

47

Id.
See Andrea Harrison, Periodic Review Boards for Law-of-War Detention in
Guantanamo, 24 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 541, 572 (2018).
49
About the Periodic Review Board, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. PERIODIC REV. SECRETARIAT,
https://www.prs.mil/About-the-PRB (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
50
See Annie Himes, Two PRB Reviews and Two No-Shows as Detainees Continue to
Opt Out, HUM. RTS. FIRST (May 28, 2019) (“Since 2017, no PRB review has cleared a
detainee for release or transfer. The five detainees cleared for transfer under the Obama
administration—two through the PRB process and three by the PRB’s predecessor, the
Guantanamo Review Task Force—have yet to leave Guantanamo because a PRB
determination does not guarantee release. Furthermore, the Trump administration
dismantled the State Department’s infrastructure for carrying out transfers.”),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/two-prb-reviews-and-two-no-shows-detainees-contin
ue-opt-out.
51
See, e.g., Carol Rosenberg, Fired War Court Overseer Says He Was Exploring Plea
Deals in 9/11, USS Cole Cases, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.c
om/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/article206477629.html;
Carol Rosenberg, Pentagon Prosecutors Seek Trial of 3 Guantanamo Prisoners for
Indonesia Bombings, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/us/
politics/pentagon-guantanamo-indonesia-bombings.html [hereinafter Rosenberg-Pentagon
Prosecutors].
48
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Guantanamo detainee to make a plea bargain in spite of their guilt or
innocence, it is necessary to understand both how pleading works in the
domestic system and what specific circumstances about Guantanamo
exacerbate these pressures. Thus, this section will start by outlining the
pressures to agree to a plea bargain that influence defendants in the civilian
criminal justice system before explaining how those pressures are
heightened in the military commissions system used to try Guantanamo
Bay detainees.
A. Plea Bargaining in Article III and State Courts
Plea bargaining in the United States’ criminal justice system functions
according to predictable principles. Professor Albert W. Alschuler
describes this system as one of both “cost bargaining” and “odds
bargaining.”52 “Cost bargaining,” from the perspective of a hypothetical
prosecutor, is the choice to make a bargain the defendant would find
desirable for the purpose of saving on costs at trial.53 “Odds bargaining,”
on the other hand, is more relevant to this Comment’s analysis, as it is
defined as the mechanism by which a prosecutor determines what offer to
make, while the defendant determines whether such an offer would be
favorable enough for him to take.54 Odds bargaining can, therefore, be said
to be the calculus that a given prosecutor and defendant must engage in
when negotiating plea deals. As such, it is based on the odds of conviction
at trial and the likely sentence the defendant would get if convicted at
trial.55 Alschuler gives the example of a negotiation in which there is a
fifty-fifty chance that the defendant is convicted of a crime that will likely
result in a ten-year sentence.56 In accordance with such odds, a rational
prosecutor would therefore offer the defendant a plea offer of five years. 57
Given that prosecutors in these situations often wish to make plea-offers as
desirable as possible, however, Alschuler posits that a plea offer of less
than five years would likely be the result. 58
Operating within the framework of this foundational concept of odds
bargaining are a number of factors that influence the defendant’s decision
to accept a plea bargain—even in cases where the defendant is innocent. 59
52

Albert W. Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the Innocent, 79 ALB.
L. REV. 919, 919 (2015/2016).
53
Alschuler, supra note 52, at 919–920.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1119–20 (2008)
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Most relevant to the case of Guantanamo detainees are the “trial tax,” the
reduced threat of reputational damage, and the practice of overcharging. 60
Even for innocent defendants, all of these factors contribute in varying
ways to the desirability of plea-bargaining in the civilian system. 61 When
considering the far less predictable and more legally complex system that
Guantanamo Bay detainees act within, these factors play a more significant
role.
An important aspect of the pressure to plead guilty is referred to as the
“trial tax,” which is the practice of imposing longer sentences on those who
are found guilty after exercising their right to a trial than on those who
plead guilty. 62 While it is possible to think of this as a reward for pleading
rather than as a penalty for going to trial, this distinction is difficult to
defend conceptually,63 as even Justice Anthony Kennedy has suggested that
sentencing guidelines are written to be harsher than necessary in order to
leave room for plea bargaining.64 Advocates of the plea bargaining process
suggest that defendants who plead guilty are simply receiving the benefit of
a shorter sentence in exchange for their cooperation. 65 That said, such a
benefit is only conceivable as an alternative to the longer sentence the
defendant would receive after a trial. Thus, disentangling reward from
penalty is not an easy feat.66 Arguments that insist the longer sentence is
proper, while the shorter is a break, require acceptance of a puzzling idea:
more than ninety percent of all defendants67 deemed guilty end up
receiving inappropriately light sentences, while only a tiny minority receive
the “correct” one. 68 Even those proponents who advocate for the position
(stating thesis that guilty pleas are often the “least-bad option” even for innocent
defendants).
60
See infra Part III B.
61
See Bowers, supra note 59.
62
Bowers, supra note 59, at 1158.
63
Steven P. Grossman, An Honest Approach to Plea Bargaining, 29 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 101, 109 (2005).
64
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (quoting Rachel Barkow, Separation of
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1034 (2006)) (“‘[Defendants] who do
take their case to trial and lose receive longer sentences than even Congress or the
prosecutor might think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on the books largely
for bargaining purposes.’”)
65
Brian Johnson, Trials and Tribulations: The Trial Tax and the Process of
Punishment, 48 CRIME & JUST. 313, 332 (2019) (“There is disagreement over whether pleatrial disparities are plea discounts or trial penalties. Champions of discounts maintain that
plea defendants receive rewards for admitting guilt and cooperating. Proponents of penalties
argue that trial defendants are unfairly punished for exercising a constitutional right.”).
66
J. Vincent Aprile II, Judicial Imposition of the Trial Tax, 29 CRIM. JUST. 30 (2014).
67
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 135 (2012).
68
See Johnson, supra note 65, at 332 for a look at the debate between considering this
concept as a “trial tax” or a “plea discount.”
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that there is a normative value in plea bargaining for innocent defendants in
low-stakes cases agree that the reward of the reduced sentence is
transformed into the threat of a heavier one in high-stakes cases. 69
A second motivation that figures prominently in the analysis of why
people enter guilty pleas to crimes for which they are innocent is that some
categories of defendants simply have less to lose than others. 70 For
individuals facing their first-ever criminal charge, there are many serious
consequences of a conviction that can reduce the incentive to plead guilty, 71
likely even in scenarios in which the “odds bargaining” calculus would
indicate that accepting the plea offer is rational.
Among these
disadvantages are the threat of deportation for some defendants, 72 loss of
the right to vote, loss of eligibility for public benefits, and reduced job
opportunities.73 These factors, however, lose much of their weight when
the defendant already has been convicted of a similar crime in the past. 74
This kind of defendant, even when innocent, has much less to lose than a
defendant with a clean record and is for that reason much more likely to
accept a plea bargain.75
Perhaps the single most important factor to consider in looking at a
defendant’s choice to accept a plea bargain is the problem of prosecutors
“overcharging” defendants. Overcharging is exactly what it sounds like—
the common practice of piling on multiple charges that would be difficult
to prove at trial for the purpose of extracting a guilty plea for a lesser
crime. 76 The effect of overcharging is that both guilty and innocent
defendants are influenced to accept plea agreements, not because they seek
the “reward” of a reduced sentence, but instead because they are afraid of
the harsh sentences that could accompany a guilty verdict for these more
severe crimes.77 As an exercise using simple numbers, we could imagine
69

See Bowers, supra note 59, at 1157.
Bowers, supra note 59, at 1135–1137 (suggesting that most innocent defendants who
submit to plea bargains are recidivists charged with low-stakes offenses, and their rational
calculus leads them to guilty pleas in part because they have “already suffered most of the
corollary consequences that typically stem from convictions”).
71
See The Costs and Benefits of Plea Bargains, JAABLAW.COM, https://jbabblaw.com/t
he-costs-and-benefits-of-plea-bargains (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
72
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2018) (defining offenses deportable under federal law).
73
Fact Sheet—Barriers to Successful Re-entry of Formerly Incarcerated People,
LEADERSHIP CONF. (Mar. 27, 2017), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/ReEntry-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
74
Bowers, supra note 59, at 1122.
75
Id.
76
Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37,
48 (1983).
77
See Bowers, supra note 59, at 1155–56.
70
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that if the odds of a conviction are only five percent, but the potential
sentence is forty years due to overcharging, a rational defendant may
accept a plea for two years in prison, even without having committed any
crime at all.78 Because of the incredible stakes present in going to trial with
such a high potential sentence, defendants often choose the plea agreement
to avoid the risk of trial.79
B. How Legal and Practical Differences between the Military
Commissions System at Guantanamo and the Civilian Criminal
Justice System Exacerbate the Pressure to Plead
It is no great insight to suggest that Guantanamo Bay’s unique
circumstances may impact a detainee in many ways. 80 In this section, this
Comment will lay out some of the differences between the military
commissions system at Guantanamo Bay and the civilian criminal justice
system that cause Guantanamo detainees to experience an increased
pressure to plead guilty. The status of detainees under the NDAA and the
numerous procedural differences between the military commissions system
and the United States criminal justice system exacerbate the already intense
pressures to plead for Guantanamo detainees. Additionally, although this
factor would remain relevant even after transfer to an Article III court, this
Comment’s analysis would be incomplete without examining how the
pressure to plead is increased by the fact that Guantanamo detainees have
already been found guilty in the court of public opinion.
Unlike defendants in regular courts, who are entitled to release if
either there is not enough probable cause to charge them with a crime or if
they are acquitted of a crime, 81 detainees of the War on Terror occupy a
unique legal status that makes them subject to indefinite detention,
irrespective of their culpability for any triable offense. 82 Their designation
78
Note that these numbers are meant to be simple, but they are not representative of
situations that most defendants would likely face. Bowers suggests that when the charges
are very serious, prosecutors are much less likely to offer lenient sentences. Bowers, supra
note 59, at 1156.
79
Bowers, supra note 59, at 1158.
80
The system is so unique, in fact, that it is misleading to refer to the men at
Guantanamo as “defendants” because only seven of the forty men currently held there are
currently being tried in military commissions. Guantanamo by the Numbers, HUM. RTS.
FIRST (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/guantanamo-numbers.
For this reason, we refer to them instead as detainees.
81
HON. WILLIAM H. ERICKSON ET AL., UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES AND
COMMENTS ¶ 5B.02 (Matthew Bender & Co., 65th ed., 2019).
82
Jonathan Hafetz, Detention Without End: Reexamining the Indefinite Confinement of
Terrorism Suspects Through the Lens of Criminal Sentencing, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 326, 347
(2014).
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as detainees subject to indefinite detention is military in nature, not
punitive. 83 For this reason, it lives in a conceptual world distinct from
principles of fairness and justice. 84 In order to justify continued detention,
the government must show, by a standard of proof that lies between “some
evidence” and a “preponderance of the evidence,” that the detainee in
question meets the detention standard. 85 This has been articulated as “‘an
individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al-Qaeda forces, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or
its coalition partners,’ or the modified definition offered by the government
that requires that an individual ‘substantially support’ enemy forces.” 86
However, for defendants accused of war crimes, the government must meet
a higher bar to secure a conviction, proving the allegations beyond a
reasonable doubt.87
Almost every war crime triable by military
commission that is currently considered constitutionally permissible 88
requires at least one overt act that goes beyond being a part of al-Qaeda or
the Taliban.89 This leaves behind a gap: people who likely supported alQaeda or the Taliban, but who are not indictable for any war crime. As a
consequence, many detainees have been held without charge by the United
States government in Guantanamo Bay and other sites since 2002. 90
Because of this odd legal status, a person could be charged and acquitted
by a military commission, but may nonetheless continue to meet the
definition of an NDAA detainee, and thus would remain subject to
continued detention under the AUMF.91
Though it is outside the scope of this Comment to discuss the
numerous procedural differences between the system of military
commissions and the civilian criminal justice system, many legal scholars

See id., at 332 (discussing the “nonpunitive” nature of confinement at Guantanamo
and suggesting the application of criminal sentencing principles to improve fairness in the
system).
84
See id.
85
Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103–1104 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
86
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
87
See Comparison of Rules and Procedures in Tribunals that Try Individuals for
Alleged War Crimes, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. OFFICE OF MIL. COMMISSIONS, https://www.mc.mil
/ABOUTUS/LegalSystemComparison.aspx.
88
“Providing material support for terrorism” is no longer chargeable against detainees
whose relevant actions took place prior to 2006, while the charge of “conspiracy” in the
same circumstances is on trickier legal footing. For discussion on this, see infra Part IV.
89
See 10 U.S.C. § 950t (2018).
90
See A History of the Detainee Population, supra note 46.
91
Oona Hathaway, The Power to Detain: Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11,
38 YALE J. INT’L L. 123, 127 n.18 (2013).
83
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have covered this topic in depth. 92 It is uncontroverted that military
commissions, unlike trials in other federal courts, do not require a
unanimous jury verdict, admit hearsay evidence much more leniently, and
do not afford as much opportunity for defendants to obtain witnesses as
compared to the prosecution. 93 Because of these differences, as well as the
relative rarity of military commissions, detainees at Guantanamo Bay have
far less information available to help them predict trial outcomes than do
defendants in the civilian criminal justice system.
C. How Differences Create Increased Pressure to Plead
Having examined some of the important distinctions between the
civilian system of justice and the military commissions system at
Guantanamo, we can now readily see how these differences create a
pressure to plead that is far greater in the military commissions system. Put
simply, the uniqueness of the system at Guantanamo decreases the odds
that a detainee will be able to escape detention by going to trial. This
works in several ways due to the interrelationship of the unique factors at
Guantanamo.
The uncertainty of release upon acquittal at trial reduces the
desirability of going to trial to a point unimaginable in a civilian context. 94
Whether or not the United States government would ever actually choose to
continue detaining a person acquitted by military commission is certainly a
matter worthy of debate. For a detainee, however, simply understanding
that the government could legally keep him in detention after an acquittal at
trial would make any agreement that secures release look quite attractive.
Detainees also have good reasons to assume that their likelihood of
acquittal at trial is lower than it would be in the civilian system due to the
procedural differences that tip the scales in favor of the government.

92
See, e.g., David Glazier, Destined for an Epic Fail, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 903 (2014);
Janet Cooper Alexander, The Law-Free Zone and Back Again, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 551
(2013).
93
See David J. R. Frakt, Applying International Fair Trial Standards to the Military
Commissions of Guantanamo, 37 S. ILL. U. L. J. 551 (2013).
94
Just like the prohibition on credit for time served, the possibility of continued
detention also legally applies to defendants who enter guilty pleas. See Offer for Pretrial
Agreement, United States v. Darbi (Dec. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Darbi Offer for Pretrial
Agreement], https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alDarbi2/Al%20Darbi%20II%20(AE010).p
df. However, having seen that men have in fact been transferred more or less in accordance
with their plea agreements gives detainees a much better reason to believe that the
government would not intentionally make a plea agreement only to violate it. Additionally,
such a move works against the government’s interests because giving detainees a reason to
distrust plea bargains would logically reduce the likelihood of convincing future detainees to
agree to them.
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To see how these pressures play out on an actual detainee, we can
look to the case of Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen who was detained by
U.S. forces after a firefight in Afghanistan. 95 Khadr’s case is an excellent
example for our purposes because he was the type of detainee who would
seem to have had good reasons to go to trial in an Article III court, and he
maintained his innocence after pleading guilty and being transferred to
Canada.
Omar Khadr was a Canadian citizen who was captured in Afghanistan
in 2002 in the midst of hostilities when he was fifteen years old. 96 Khadr
was badly wounded during capture, suffering a bullet in the chest and
shrapnel wounds to his head and eye. 97 Interrogators began questioning
him before his wounds had finished healing, and shortly thereafter began
subjecting him to what was then called “enhanced interrogation.” In his
case, this included beatings, prolonged standing, and deprivation of toilet
facilities, among other measures.98
Through these techniques, his
interrogators extracted full confessions that Khadr denied as soon as he was
able to meet with representatives from the Canadian government. 99
The United States charged Khadr with war crimes in 2007 after the
passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“2006 MCA”). 100 The
government alleged that he had been seen throwing a grenade that killed a
U.S. soldier.101 The charges against him were “murder in violation of the
law of war,” “attempted murder in violation of law of war,” “conspiracy,”
“providing material support for terrorism,” and “spying.”102
Prior to reaching his trial by military commission, facts began to
emerge that called into question whether evidence against Khadr would be
sufficient for a conviction. The most obvious reason for this is that due to
his age, he would be considered to be a child soldier under international
95

In re Khadr, 823 F.3d 92, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Ian Austen, Omar Khadr, Former Guantanamo Detainee, Is Released on Bail in
Canada, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/08/world/americas/
omar-khadr-canada-guantanamo-detainee-released-on-bail.html.
97
Jeff Tietz, The Unending Torture of Omar Khadr, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 24, 2006),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/the-unending-torture-of-omar-khadr181126.
98
Id.
99
Affidavit of Omar Ahmed Khadr, Khadr v. Prime Minister of Can. (Jul. 30, 2008),
https://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Mackin/khadr_repat_AffidavitofOmarKhadr.PDF;
Omar Khadr (Guantanamo Bay) Interrogation Tapes, YOUTUBE (Jul. 15, 2008),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNCyrFV2G_0.
100
Referred Charges Dated 4/24/2007, United States v. Omar Ahmed Khadr (Apr. 24,
20017), https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/Khadr/Khadr%20(AE001).pdf.
101
Tietz, supra note 97.
102
In re Khadr, 823 F.3d 92, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
96
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treaties. 103 Additionally, due to the coerced nature of his confession,
lawyers could have argued that it was inadmissible against him. 104 Even
more damning for the government, however, was the release of a leaked
document in 2008 that revealed that Khadr’s primary accuser had not
actually seen him throw the grenade that formed the foundation of the bulk
of his charges, but that he had instead surmised it from context. 105
Looking at Khadr’s situation in light of the obvious deficiencies in the
government’s case, a person in an Article III court may rationally have
chosen to go to trial and to attempt to clear his name, but such a move in
Khadr’s case would have made far less sense. Having been held at
Guantanamo Bay for eight years by 2010, it would have been perfectly
reasonable for Khadr to believe that his reputation was already forever
ruined. At the same time, he had few reasons to believe that he could
escape Guantanamo Bay by any means other than a plea agreement. By
2010 Khadr had already tried a number of procedurally based interlocutory
appeals, but none of them panned out.106 He was denied even the most
fundamental of American judicial protections, the right to confront his
accuser, when a military commission judge in 2007 determined he was too
dangerous to have access to the identities of the men claiming to have
witnessed the acts that gave rise to his charges. 107 In 2010, Khadr gave up
on his case and signed a plea agreement. 108 He later said this was because
he felt that he had been given a “hopeless choice” and that he saw no other
way to avoid indefinite detention at Guantanamo. 109
Khadr’s plea agreement granted him favorable terms and transfer to
his home country, but in no sense settled the question of his culpability.
103
Madeline Torrie, The Omar Khadr Controversy: Child Soldiers in Canadian and
International Law, CANADIAN LAWS. FOR INT’L HUM. RTS. (Dec. 15, 2017), http://claihr.ca/2
017/12/15/the-omar-khadr-controversy-child-soldiers-in-canadian-and-international-law.
104
Indeed, Khadr’s counsel is now using this argument in his appeal before the Court of
Military Commission Review. Brief on Behalf of Appellant, United States v. Khadr 1, 8
(USCMCR Nov. 8, 2013) (No. 13-005), https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/Omar13005/Khadr%20Brief%20on%20Behalf%20of%20Appellant.pdf.
105
Michelle Shephard, Khadr Secret Document Released by Accident, THE STAR
(Toronto) (Feb. 4, 2008), https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2008/02/04/khadr_secret_d
ocument_released_by_accident.html.
106
See, e.g., O.K. v. Bush, 344 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.D.C. 2004); O.K. v. Bush, 377 F.
Supp. 2d 102 (D.D.C. 2005); Khadr v. Bush, 587 F. Supp. 2d 225 (D.D.C. 2008); Khadr v.
Obama, 724 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D.D.C. 2010).
107
See William Glaberson, Witness Names to Be Withheld from Detainee, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 1, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/01/us/nationalspecial3/01gitmo.html.
108
Austen, supra note 96.
109
Michelle Shephard, Omar Khadr: No Memory of Firefight in Afghanistan, THE STAR
(Toronto) (Dec. 13, 2013), https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/12/13/omar_khadr_n
o_memory_of_firefight_in_afghanistan.html.
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Through the agreement, he exchanged his guilty plea for a promise of eight
years imprisonment and a transfer to Canada after at least one year.110 The
United States ended up transferring him after two years, and the Canadian
government released him on bail in 2015. 111 In his ongoing appeal to this
conviction, a suit against the government of Canada, Khadr swore that he
was tortured by both U.S. and Canadian forces after his capture, and that he
was subjected to especially harsh treatment at Bagram Airfield in 2002,
shortly after his capture and while he was still recovering from gunshot
wounds.112 He claimed, and Canadian interrogation transcripts confirmed,
that he told Canadian forces that everything he told the Americans had
been fabricated, and that he had simply been responding to torture.113 The
Canadian government settled the suit and apologized to Khadr,114 who
continues to maintain that he has no recollection of the acts he was accused
of, that he confessed under duress, and that he agreed to a plea bargain only
because he feared that he would be subjected to indefinite detention
otherwise. 115
Whether Khadr was telling the truth in his plea agreement or in the
subsequent Canadian case, the world, and the families of the man he
allegedly killed, will never know. For the same reason, we will also remain
ignorant about whether or not the harsh interrogation methods used on him
produced the truthful confession intended or a fabricated one invented for
the sole purpose of avoiding additional punishment. What is certain,
however, is that the family of the man who allegedly died by Khadr’s hand
remains disturbed and without closure. As recently as June of 2017 the
slain soldier’s widow, Tabitha Speer, sought Canadian enforcement of a
judgment against Khadr that she had been awarded in a U.S. court in
2015.116

110
Offer for Pre-trial Agreement, United States v. Khadr (Oct. 13, 2010),
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/Khadr/Khadr%20(AE341).pdf.
111
Austen, supra note 96.
112
Affidavit of Omar Ahmed Khadr, Khadr v. Prime Minister of Can. at 1−3 (Jul. 30,
2008),
https://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Mackin/khadr_repat_AffidavitofOmarKhadr.PDF.
113
Id. at 1−8; Omar Khadr (Guantanamo Bay) Interrogation Tapes, YOUTUBE (Jul. 15,
2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNCyrFV2G_0.
114
Ian Austen, Canada Apologizes and Pays Millions to Citizen Held at Guantanamo
Bay, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/world/canada/omarkhadr-apology-guantanamo-bay.html.
115
See Shephard, supra note 109.
116
Mark Gollom, Omar Khadr Fights Attempt by Soldier’s Widow to Freeze His Assets,
CBC (Jul. 12, 2017), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/omar-khadr-fights-back-1.4201788.
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IV. THE PROBLEM OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A WAR CRIME
The problem of the pressure to plead guilty is made worse by the
confusion about what crimes can actually be charged by military
commission. Because changes in the law have completely eliminated the
lowest rung of “war crimes” as triable offenses, detainees today do not
have the option to plead to the same crimes that have secured release for
other men. 117 Without these lesser charges available, detainees are faced
with very serious charges that ratchet up the stakes of either choosing to go
to trial or accepting a plea. While this issue does not necessarily increase
the pressure to plead guilty for a detainee in all cases, the problem
contributes significantly to the inherent injustice within the military
commissions system by putting detainees in a position to be held
responsible for offenses they did not commit. In other cases, where a very
favorable plea bargain is made available, this confusion could in theory
function as an extreme form of overcharging, using charges like “murder in
violation of the law of war” to threaten a detainee who may only have had a
very attenuated relationship to any murder.
Addressing first the legal changes that reduced the number of
chargeable war crimes, two major decisions have reshaped the landscape in
this regard. Decisions in the cases of Salim Hamdan and Ali Hamza
Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul on the constitutionality of certain offenses
defined in the 2006 MCA have eliminated the offense called Providing
Material Support for Terrorism118 and called into question whether inchoate
conspiracy can withstand scrutiny by the federal courts. Because these
were the lowest-level war crimes codified under the Act, this development
may create pressure for men who may not have enough evidence against
them to be charged with any currently valid war crime to plead guilty to
serious offenses such as terrorism and attacking civilians. After a short
explanation of this case law, this Comment will show how this
phenomenon is illustrated through the case of Ahmed al Darbi.
In a case usually referred to as Hamdan II, the D.C. Circuit Court
considered challenges to the charges against Salim Hamdan and found that
the charge of “providing material support for terrorism” was not
permissible when used against a defendant like Hamdan. 119 Salim Hamdan
is a Yemeni national who was captured in Afghanistan in 2001 and
transferred to Guantanamo Bay in 2002. 120 Hamdan, like Omar Khadr, was
charged prior to the pivotal Supreme Court decisions that defined the right
117
118
119
120

Hafetz, supra note 82, at 329.
Hafetz, supra note 82, at 329.
Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2012
Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 131 (D.D.C. 2008).
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to habeas review and other constitutional rights for detainees, and therefore
went through a complicated procedural history121 prior to facing the
charges that would ultimately stick: “conspiracy” and “providing material
support for terrorism,” on April 5, 2007.122 Unlike most detainees whose
charges are referred, Hamdan went through a full trial by military
commission, which found him guilty of the charge of material support, but
not of the conspiracy charge. 123 The judge sentenced him to sixty-six
months imprisonment with credit for time served and transferred him to
Yemen to serve the remaining months of his sentence. 124 Hamdan then
appealed the charges on the ground that, although codified in the 2006
MCA with the intention of applying retroactively, the “war crime” of
“providing material support to terrorism” could not be charged to an
individual who committed the culpable acts prior to the enactment of the
law. 125 After losing his appeal with the Court of Military Commission
Review, Hamdan appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which
then reversed. 126 The court reasoned that while the executive branch could
charge a crime that was illegal under the law of war prior to the relevant
acts but only codified subsequently, it was an ex post facto violation to
charge a crime that had only become triable by military commission after
the relevant acts took place.127
Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul’s case brought a similar
challenge to the D.C. Circuit Court, but dealt instead with the question of
“conspiracy” and did not yield such conclusive results. 128 Despite not
creating binding legal precedent, the case is nonetheless useful in
considering how the military commission’s prosecutors may view the
availability of different kinds of charges. Bahlul, also Yemeni, was
121
Part of this complicated history is Hamdan I. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006). Four justices would have ruled in that case that “conspiracy” was not a war crime
triable by military commission. Due to the lack of a majority on this issue and the
subsequent codification of “conspiracy” as a war crime, the case set no precedent on the
matter of “conspiracy” even though it gave the matter extensive treatment. Id. at 600–13.
As a consequence, Bahlul sets the precedent on this issue.
122
Charges and Specifications at *3−4, United States of America v. Salim Ahmed
Hamdan (Military Comm’n Apr. 5, 2007).
123
Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by Al
Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
124
Hamdan at 1240–41. Note that this took place prior to the 2009 amendments to the
MCA that disallowed granting credit for time served.
125
Id. at 1241.
126
Id.
127
Id. While this holding was explicitly overruled in Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2014), the holding in this latter case was so similar as to be indistinguishable for
purposes of this Comment.
128
See Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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accused of making promotional videos for al-Qaeda and serving as a
secretary to Osama bin Laden, and for these activities he was charged with
“conspiracy” and “providing material support for terrorism.” 129 Bahlul
declined to participate in his own trial, leading the military commission to
find him guilty on both charges. 130 His appeal on this matter reached the
D.C. Circuit Court three times.131
In the 2016 en banc case, the majority of the court agreed that the
charge of “conspiracy” was constitutional for Bahlul’s case specifically,
but the reasoning for the decision did not have a majority. 132 The fourjudge plurality decided the case on the ground that Congress had the power
to define inchoate conspiracy as a war crime in the 2006 MCA, while one
judge did not reach the question due to the application of plain error
review, and another affirmed on the ground that the specific facts of
Bahlul’s case justified an understanding of the conviction as using
conspiracy as a theory of vicarious liability instead of as an inchoate
crime. 133 Three judges dissented, reasoning that Article III of the
Constitution simply does not empower Congress to declare inchoate
conspiracy to be a war crime triable by military commission. 134 Because of
the lack of a majority on the question of the constitutionality of the
Conspiracy, it is possible that judges Wilkins and Millett would rule that a
case of true inchoate conspiracy—one in which there was no war crime
completed by a coconspirator, when reviewed de novo—would present the
issue properly and cause them to rule against the constitutionality of this
“war crime.”
Because of this remaining uncertainty, and the fact that the Court of
Military Commissions Review (“CMCR”) recently decided not to rehear
the issue so that it could properly adjudicate the issue de novo,135 the
government may prefer to avoid resolving the issue by simply not charging
inchoate conspiracy, thus disallowing plea agreements for conspiracies that
didn’t take place, the lowest charge that would remain without Material
Support. Irrespective of how the government chooses to move forward on
inchoate conspiracy, it seems to have determined for the time being that
completed conspiracy, as a standalone crime and not merely a theory of
liability, is constitutionally safe enough to bet on. Shortly after the
129

Id. at 5–6.
See id. at 7.
131
Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Al Bahlul v. United States, 792
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
132
Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 758.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Bahlul v. United States, 374 F. Supp 3d 1250, 1250 (USCMCR 2019).
130
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CMCR’s most recent Bahlul decision, prosecutors added counts of
standalone conspiracy to the charge sheets of three detainees who had
previously only been charged with more serious crimes.136
The significance of Hamdan II to the prosecutors and detainees at
Guantanamo can hardly be overstated. Of the eight men convicted under
the military commission system at Guantanamo, three (including Hamdan
himself) have had their convictions for Material Support vacated. 137 One
other man, who confessed to having been a driver and a cook for Osama
bin Laden, was also convicted only on Material Support,138 but has not had
his conviction vacated. 139 Numerous other detainees subject to the same
charges had their charges dropped and were either released or left in
detention without charges.140 For those at Guantanamo Bay attempting to
move detainees through the system, and for many detainees themselves, the
loss of triable offenses at the bottom rung of culpability and prison time is
potentially devastating. One detainee, Sufiyan Barhoumi, grew so
exhausted with his attempts to navigate the system after the loss of the two
most commonly tried offenses that he literally invited military commissions
prosecutors to charge him with anything at all, declaring that he would
plead guilty to any charge and take any sentence. 141 His lawyers say that
the prosecution declined the invitation, informing them that they would
only accept a plea if Barhoumi were willing to testify against another
detainee. 142
Another example of this phenomenon can be found in the case of
Ahmed Mohammed Ahmed Haza al-Darbi. Al-Darbi is a Saudi national
who pleaded guilty to facilitating a plan that culminated in the attack of a
French oil tanker called the Limburg several months after U.S. forces took
him into custody. 143 The government first filed charges against al Darbi on

136

Rosenberg-Pentagon Prosecutors, supra note 51.
The other two men are David Hicks and Noor Uthman Mohamed. The Guantanamo
Trials, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/guantanamo-trials (last visited Nov. 3,
2019).
138
This is Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al-Qosi, and he was also convicted of conspiracy
to provide material support for terrorism. Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al-Qosi, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Oct. 25, 2012, 3:22 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/25/ibrahim-ahmedmahmoud-al-qosi.
139
The Guantanamo Trials, supra note 137.
140
See id.
141
Jess Bravin, Detainee Begs to be Charged as Legal Limbo Worsens, WALL STREET J.
(Jul. 16, 2013), https://tinyurl.com/rsyrd3j.
142
Id.
143
Charlie Savage, Guantanamo Detainee Pleads Guilty in 2002 Attack on Tanker Off
Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/21/us/guantanamodetainee-ahmed-muhammed-haza-al-darbi.html.
137
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December 20, 2007, for “conspiracy” and “providing material support for
terrorism.”144 In the charge sheet, the government described overt acts such
as working in an alleged al-Qaeda training camp, receiving weapons
training, and purchasing a boat and other significant materials to be used in
furtherance of the plot. 145 After almost two years of pretrial motions, the
government withdrew all charges against al Darbi on November 25,
2009.146 Hamdan had initiated the appeal that would lead to the Hamdan II
case on October 15, 2009, with a brief advancing the position that Material
Support for Terrorism presented an ex post facto issue.147 While it cannot
be known whether or not this was the reason for the government’s
withdrawal of charges against al-Darbi, the timing suggests it could have
been. Al-Darbi received a new set of charges in 2012,148 and then entered
into a plea agreement on December 20, 2013.149 This agreement included
altogether different and much more serious charges than the ones dismissed
in 2009, including “terrorism” and “attacking civilians.”150 Al Darbi’s
pretrial agreement explicitly stated that he would not request credit for time
served in detention once sentenced, and set forth the suggested sentence as
thirteen to fifteen years from the date of the judge accepting the plea. 151
The agreement also included provisions for release after nine years, so long
as al Darbi was repatriated to Saudi Arabia and served five years of his
sentence there.152 The plea agreement also spelled out that the sentence he
would face without the agreement would be three life sentences plus twenty
additional years for each specification. 153
Because al Darbi faced similar circumstances to Omar Khadr, but
with the addition of the unavailability of Material Support and confusion
about the status of Conspiracy as a standalone offense, his situation
144

Charges and Specifications at *1, United States of America v. Ahmed Mohammed
Ahmed Haza al Darbi (Military Comm’n, Dec. 20, 2007).
145
Id. at *1−3.
146
Direction of the Convening Authority, United States of America v. Ahmed
Mohammed Ahmed Haza al Darbi (Military Comm’n, Nov. 25, 2009).
147
Brief for Appellant at 1, United States v. Hamdan, No. 09-002 (CMCR Oct. 15,
2009).
148
Charges and Specifications, United States v. Darbi (Military Comm’n Aug. 29,
2012).
149
Darbi Offer for Pretrial Agreement, supra note 94.
150
He pleaded guilty to: Attacking Civilians (10 U.S.C. §950t(2)), Attacking Civilian
Objects (10 U.S.C. §950t(3)), Hazarding a Vessel (10 U.S.C. §950t(23)), Terrorism (10
U.S.C. §950t(24)), and Attempt (10 U.S.C. §950t(28)) (both Attempt to Hazard a Vessel and
Attempting Terrorism). Charges and Specifications, United States v. Darbi (Military
Comm’n Dec. 16, 2013).
151
Darbi Offer for Pretrial Agreement, supra note 94.
152
Darbi Offer for Pretrial Agreement, supra note 94, ¶¶ 29–30; Id. at Appendix A, ¶ 4.
153
See Darbi Offer for Pretrial Agreement, supra note 94, ¶ 21.
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presented additional pressures to plead to crimes far more serious than the
ones he likely could have been convicted of in a normal civilian trial. A
rational defendant in al Darbi’s situation would have been faced with a
very difficult decision upon being served with his second set of charges. A
defendant in an Article III trial may have assessed his odds favorably,
taking into account that the government’s failure to note a link between al
Darbi’s actions and the Limburg bombing in his 2007 charges may indicate
a lack of evidentiary support for the connection. Such a defendant might
also expect a relatively light sentence, given that the six men who had
already been tried and convicted in Yemen for even more serious overt acts
in furtherance of the same attack on the Limburg were each sentenced to
only ten years in prison. 154 Taking into account the fundamental right to
credit for time served in pretrial detention, such a defendant in civilian
court would undoubtedly note that even a sentence of double the length of
that handed down in the Yemen cases would nonetheless result in fewer
remaining years of incarceration than the plea offer proposed.
V. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE COMMISSIONS
Confusion about the law, though it is a persistent and often ostensibly
insurmountable problem at Guantanamo Bay, is still not the most serious
problem plaguing Camp Justice. That title goes to the numerous scandals
and roadblocks that seem to infect every aspect of life at Guantanamo. It
would be impossible to summarize them completely, but the following
claims have been made credibly: defense attorneys found microphones in
private rooms intended to be used by detainees and their attorneys for
privileged conversations, prompting an entire defense team to quit and their
supervisor to be held in contempt of court;155 during a hearing, the video
and audio feed that broadcast the proceedings to the public were abruptly
shut off without the knowledge or consent of the judge, and it was later
discovered that an intelligence agency had been watching remotely and had
shut off the feed; 156 when defense attorneys returned to the island after
several months without hearings, more than one team found that the trailers
that served as their offices were infested with mold, and members of the
defense teams suffered medical issues as a result;157 and during pretrial
154
Ahmed Haj, Yemen Convicts 15 on Terror Charges, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2004),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A426472004Aug28.html?nav=rss_world/mideast/gulf/yemen.
155
John G. Baker, Defending the Rule of Law: The Military Commissions Defense
Organization, 40 CHAMPION 18, 23 (2016).
156
Id.
157
See Carol Rosenberg, 9/11 Trial Lawyers Find Mold in Their Top-Secret Offices:
Could It Snarl Gitmo Hearings?, MCCLATCHY (Nov. 11, 2018), https://www.mcclatchydc.
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hearings for the 9/11 case, a detainee suddenly recognized that his
courtroom interpreter was his former interrogator from a CIA black site. 158
This is only a small sampling of the issues.
In a more complicated episode for the 9/11 litigation, a potentially
serious ethical breach may have materially influenced the case when a
member of the Department of Defense arranged for the firing of a major
actor in the military commissions, the Convening Authority, possibly for
reasons related to the judicial or quasi-judicial determinations of the
Convening Authority.159 Although this last point is difficult to understand,
it is important because it highlights the inherent susceptibility of the
commissions to major structural problems.
The Convening Authority is a figure in the military commissions that
has no civilian equivalent.160 This person is both a manager and a judicial
decision-maker, making determinations about how to allocate funds as well
as which charges to refer for prosecution. 161 Though this position is wellestablished in military justice and makes perfect sense for a court martial,
the military commissions are a very different context.162 In 2016, the
Convening Authority, Harvey Rishikof, was fired from his position,
allegedly to make the commissions “more cohesive.” 163 It also came to
light that Rishikof had been considering plea agreements for the 9/11 case,
was not referring all of the charges in another pending case, and had made
a number of other judicial or quasi-judicial decisions with which his
superiors in the Department of Defense disagreed. 164 If it were found that
any members of the Department of Defense acted improperly either in
firing Mr. Rishikof, or in soliciting a replacement who would be less
inclined toward plea bargaining, this would constitute unlawful influence
(“UI”).165 UI and the appearance of UI can both serve as grounds for

com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/guantanamo/article221501020.html.
158
Ben Fox, Interpreter’s Alleged Link to CIA Halts Guantanamo Case, MIL. TIMES
(Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.militarytimes.com/2015/02/10/interpreter-s-alleged-link-to-ciahalts-guantanamo-case/.
159
Charlie Savage, Mattis Says Guantanamo Lawyers Were Fired Over Temperament,
Not Legal Work, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/us/polit
ics/guantanamo-officials-fired-mattis.html.
160
See Baker, supra note 155, at 24.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Savage, supra note 159.
164
Carol Rosenberg, Secretary of Defense Fires Guantanamo War Court Overseer,
MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/am
ericas/guantanamo/article198456714.html.
165
Savage, supra note 159.
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dismissal.166 Although the judge in this case recently found in favor of the
prosecution on this claim, the fact that it was raised at all shows the
incredible potential for conflicts of interest to influence the military
commissions.
Because of changes in the law that have taken place in the last few
years, prosecutors for the commissions have lost the three triable offenses
that were the easiest to prove and to secure pleas to. Meanwhile, a long
series of mishaps has afflicted the commissions, stalling pretrial hearings in
all of the active cases. 167 More than seventeen years after the original
crime and after seven years of pretrial hearings, the current judge in the
case against the alleged 9/11 coconspirators recently set the date for trial as
January 11, 2021.168 The many setbacks in this case and the others point to
a larger problem: the military commissions are structurally unsound. 169
Without an effective means of conducting trials or securing pleas, the
commissions now have no purpose except to delay justice for both
detainees and those who were harmed by the crimes with which the
detainees are accused.
VI. CONCLUSION
When President Obama left office with forty-one detainees still
remaining in custody at Guantanamo Bay, the Periodic Review Boards
were still in place. Because the PRBs are an internal executive branch
creation, however, it was impossible to determine exactly why they have
now suddenly seemed to stop functioning after years of working effectively
to process and release detainees. 170 Now that President Trump seems to
have immobilized the review boards that the executive branch had been
using to transfer, free, or charge detainees, he has given the people of the
United States the opportunity to recognize that the PRBs were essentially
detainees’ last hope. Now, there is practically no way out of Guantanamo
at all, and absolutely no way out without pleading guilty to a serious war
crime or encountering a spontaneous moment of executive mercy, a
situation that will likely leave most of the forty men currently in detention
166
See Monu Bedi, Unraveling Unlawful Command Influence, 93 WASH. U. L. REV.
1401, 1424 (2016).
167
Baker, supra note 155.
168
Carol Rosenberg, Trial for Men Charged with Plotting 9/11 Attacks Is Set for 2021,
N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/us/politics/sept-11-trialguantanamo-bay.html.
169
For a fuller analysis of this point, see David Glazier, supra note 92.
170
See Benjamin R. Farley, Who Broke Periodic Review at Guantanamo Bay?,
LAWFARE (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/who-broke-periodic-reviewguantanamo-bay.
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there to die before they could hope to escape. Such a system may promote
the aims of military detention, but it cannot produce any real accountability
for acts of terrorism.
Luckily, this is not a problem with a completely obscure solution.
Most of the advantages of Article III courts over the military commissions
have been discussed elsewhere, but have largely been forgotten by many
Americans and legal scholars.171 Although it may be unlikely that the
Department of Justice will insist on its own that it be able to charge
detainees outside of the military commissions, it is always possible for
Congress to take action to close the detention center instead of allowing it
to become a home for aged prisoners.

171
See Lewis A. Kaplan, The Implications of Trying National Security Cases in Article
III Courts, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 337 (2016).

